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DAMNESIA: AN EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION AND EVOLVING APPROACHES TO 
HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND BRAZIL 
IAN E. CECALA* & A. BRYAN ENDRES** 
ABSTRACT 
Large hydropower projects have long been political flashpoints where en-
vironmental, economic, and social considerations have vied for priority. 
Historically, economic benefits of these projects have been assumed to out-
weigh the costs, a rationale that catalyzed the construction of large hydro-
power dams around the world with little regard for their socio-environmen-
tal externalities. 
Brazil is still in a semi-developmental stage and, accordingly, perceives a 
higher demand for large hydropower projects and infrastructure. While hy-
dropower can bring immense benefits to Brazil’s energy infrastructure, 
Belo Monte’s location in the heart of the Amazon ecosystem presents seri-
ous socio-environmental concerns that challenge Brazil’s legal and regula-
tory regimes. In contrast, after a period of aggressive dam construction, 
the United States is now embracing a more critical analysis and accompa-
nying efforts directed to dam removal and decommission. This is partly due 
to increased awareness regarding the environmental and social impacts of 
dams made possible by the well-established cadre of statutes, regulatory 
agencies, and advocacy groups with the power to drive meaningful change. 
The accountability and malleability built into legal and regulatory frame-
works in the United States enables the law to adapt and overcome initial 
deficiencies in addressing the externalities surrounding hydropower devel-
opment. 
Public participation has evolved into a key element underlying any policy-
based approach to conservation, natural resources management, or appli-
cation of modern environmental law. The distinction between public par-
ticipation that is “meaningful” as opposed to public participation that is 
merely “due” under the law will only become more relevant as the social, 
environmental, and economic externalities imposed by hydropower pro-
jects become a larger consideration in regulatory law and policy. Examining 
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this distinction through case studies in the United States and Brazil offers 
an increasingly relevant perspective on the public participation’s role in ad-
dressing hydropower externalities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, the hydrologic characteristics of water have been key 
drivers in shaping not only ecological and geographic landscapes, but the social and 
cultural bedrock of civilizations. Dams represent an extension of human influence 
over the environment; molding natural resources into drivers of economic growth 
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and prosperity. Large hydropower projects have long been political flashpoints 
where environmental, economic, and social considerations have vied for priority.1 
Water management has been a key factor behind the socio-economic and political 
pressures surrounding dam construction in both developed and developing nations. 
With its extensive network of rivers, Brazil has one of the greatest hydropower 
potentials on the planet and is a nexus for examining policy implications of dam 
construction; it comes as no surprise that hydroelectric power is the country’s main 
electricity production asset, making up more than 75% of the country’s electric 
power.2 The Amazon region has been described as the final frontier for Brazilian 
hydropower development and plays a central role in hydropower efforts and their 
associated externalities.3 Belo Monte—located on the Xingu River in the Amazon 
Rainforest—is the third largest hydroelectric dam in the world.4 In a semi-develop-
mental economic environment, Brazil perceives a higher demand for large hydro-
power projects and related infrastructure.5 While hydropower can deliver signifi-
cant benefits to Brazil’s energy infrastructure, Belo Monte’s location in the Amazon 
presents serious socio-environmental concerns that challenge Brazil’s legal and reg-
ulatory regimes. Brazil’s legal structures, enforcement mechanisms, and avenues 
for public participation differ greatly from the United States—these differences and 
the impact they have on addressing hydropower externalities are crucial given the 
socio-economic benefits at stake in the Amazon. 
After a period of explosive growth in dam construction, the United States is 
now shifting into a period of dam removal and decommission.6 This is partly due to 
increased awareness regarding the environmental and social impacts of dams made 
                                                          
 1. The Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Three Gorges Dam in China, and the Grand Coulee Dam 
are among the largest and most contentious hydropower projects in the world. See Mark Tran & Claire 
Provost, Controversial Dam Projects – In Pictures, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/global-development/gallery/2012/mar/14/controversial-dam-projects-in-pictures; Leonard Orto-
lano & Katherine Kao Cushing, Grand Coulee Dam 70 Years Later: What Can We Learn?, 18 INT’L J. WATER 
RES. DEV. 373, 376–78 (2010).   
 2. Vinodh Jaichand & Alexandre Andrade Sampaio, Dam and Be Damned: The Adverse Impacts 
of Belo Monte on Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 408, 410 (2013).  See also Hydropower Sup-
plies More Than Three Quarters of Brazil’s Electric Power, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 17, 2014), 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16731.  
 3. Wilson Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, Uncertainties in Amazon Hydropower Develop-
ment: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues Around the Belo Monte Dam, 3 WATER ALTS. 249, 253 (2010). 
 4. Belo Monte Fact Sheet, INTERAMERICAN ASS’N ENVTL. DEF. 1 (Feb. 14, 2012), https://www.inter-
nationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/belomonte_fact_sheet_final-1.pdf; Maximo Anderson, 
Displaced by Brazil’s Giant Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam, ‘River People’ Reoccupy Reservoir, MONGABAY 
(Mar. 13, 2017), https://news.mongabay.com/2017/03/displaced-by-brazils-giant-belo-monte-hydroelec-
tric-dam-river-people-reoccupy-reservoir/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the 
Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 83–84 (2001) (discussing oppo-
sition to hydropower relicensing); Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson & Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the 
Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 
ENVTL. L. 709, 729 (2006); Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in the 
United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1735–36 (2012) (discussing opposition to hydropower expansion).  
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possible by the well-established cadre of statutes, regulatory agencies, and advo-
cacy groups with the power to drive meaningful change.7 The accountability and 
flexibility built into legal and regulatory frameworks in the United States have ena-
bled the law to adapt and overcome deficiencies in addressing externalities sur-
rounding hydropower development. The procedural requirements of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) serve as a check against agency action through 
public comment periods and the option for legal challenges in federal court. These 
requirements also allow agencies to hold each other accountable when proposing 
major agency actions. When the procedural process is not sufficient, substantive 
statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and regulatory frameworks, 
such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) relicensing protocols, 
provide regulatory teeth mandating consideration of environmental impacts stem-
ming from hydropower projects.8 Stakeholder pressure in some instances can push 
the legislature to update antiquated laws with fresh amendments to open previ-
ously unavailable avenues for addressing externalities without major substantive 
changes to the underlying law. The importance of public participation and effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be understated; these have and continue to 
play an integral role in helping the law adapt to meet its intended goals. 
Fundamental drivers behind large hydropower projects reflect a nation’s pre-
vailing attitude regarding the perceived social, environmental, and economic costs 
and benefits of a project.9 A country’s level of economic development often drives 
the governance mechanisms and policies used in mitigating the socio-environmen-
tal costs of hydropower projects.10 While the United States and Brazil both have 
well-established environmental regulatory frameworks in place for developing and 
managing hydropower projects, there are stark differences in how stakeholders can 
participate in the process. This Article argues that public participation in the regu-
latory process, along with effective dispute resolution mechanisms, are critical ele-
ments in addressing the socio-environmental externalities stemming from hydro-
power and ensuring that the law is capable of fulfilling its intended goals. 
In Part II, this Article explores the role of public participation in addressing 
hydropower externalities and introduces core components that make participation 
mechanisms “meaningful.” Part II also discusses the benefits and detriments of hy-
dropower and international sustainable development initiatives aimed at address-
ing associated externalities. 
Part III examines the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding hydro-
power in the United States and Brazil, emphasizing the role of public participation 
in governance structures unique to each country and setting the stage for case stud-
ies that compare the two regimes. 
                                                          
 7. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 6, at 83–84. 
 8. See id.; Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA Implementation: 
District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 144 (2013). 
 9. Marcus W. Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams: Common Lessons 
Across Development Gradients that Challenge Sustainability, 10 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 73, 83–85 (2012); 
Jonathan Rigg, Thailand’s Nam Choan Dam Project: A Case Study in the ‘Greening’ of South-East Asia, 1 
GLOBAL ECOLOGY &  BIOGEOGRAPHY LETTERS 42, 43 (1991); Sara E. Johnson & Brian E. Graber, Enlisting the Social 
Sciences in Decisions About Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 731, 732 (2002). 
 10. Beck et al., supra note 9, at 83 (emphasizing that “sufficient policies and governance mech-
anisms for environmental protection are often not implemented until after a country is developed”).  
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Part IV analyzes meaningful public participation through case studies in the 
United States and Brazil, comparing how public participation mechanisms interact. 
The legal and political firestorm surrounding Belo Monte provides a unique com-
parison to events in the United States, where participation evolved from near non-
existence to playing a major role in the evolution of modern environmental law and 
its struggles in addressing hydropower externalities. 
This Article concludes with a synopsis of case studies, with emphasis on the 
public participation’s role in dictating a result. Legal regimes, governance struc-
tures, and challenges surrounding hydropower projects are diverse. Exploring eco-
nomic, environmental, and social issues through case studies in the United States 
and Brazil will highlight these unique challenges and provide context in analyzing 
public participation’s role in addressing hydropower externalities. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Hydropower Benefits and Detriments 
Ubiquitous with industry and development, more than 45,000 large dams 
(dams greater than fifteen meters in height) have been built worldwide, providing 
benefits across a variety of scales.11 As water scarcity and drought become pressing 
global issues, dams have become valuable water storage mechanisms for industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural use.12 Dam projects often provide an influx of corporate 
financial investment and capital in developing nations, benefitting human health 
and infrastructure. 13  Perhaps most importantly, dams provide flood control 
measures while simultaneously generating carbon-free hydropower energy for lo-
cal communities.14 
Hydropower projects, however, also include a slew of negative environmental 
impacts. Dam construction inherently submerges tracts of land, destroying local 
wildlife, habitats, and ecosystems; loss of ecosystem services such as subsistence 
farmland and clean flowing water has a direct and tangible impact on the livelihood 
and culture of local communities.15 Habitat degradation or destruction in the inun-
dated zone is only part of the problem—dams also act as sediment barriers, block-
                                                          
 11. Kader Asmal, Preface to WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK 
FOR DECISION-MAKING, at i (Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2000); Beck et al., supra note 9, at 73. 
 12. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 1724. 
 13. Environmental Licensing for Hydroelectric Projects in Brazil: A Contribution to the Debate, 
BRAZ. COUNTRY MGMT. UNIT, (MAR. 28, 2008), http://documents.worldbank.org/cu-
rated/en/780411468236700081/pdf/409950v10ENGLISH0Box0334093B01PUBLIC1.pdf.  
 14. Beck et al., supra note 9, at 73–74; Martin W. Doyle et al., Dam Removal in the United States: 
Emerging Needs for Science and Policy, 84 EOS TRANSACTIONS AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION 29 (2003). 
 15. See Wilson Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, Uncertainties in Amazon Hydropower Devel-
opment: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues Around the Belo Monte Dam, 3 WATER ALTS. 249, 251 
(2010). 
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ing natural riverine flows of water, sediment, and critical nutrients that in turn im-
pact fish and other aquatic organisms.16 Decreased occurrence of natural flooding 
mechanisms have a stark impact on fertility restoration in riparian areas.17 Fish and 
riverine resources are critical facets to the livelihood of many indigenous peoples, 
providing both financial security and food; these communities are often the most 
heavily impacted by hydropower developments.18 Dams could even be pegged as 
point-source polluters; warming water and lowering oxygen content can lead to al-
gal blooms, blocking and killing native species both up and downstream.19 
B. International Sustainable Development Initiatives 
Soft law incentives20—such as those outlined in the hallmark report by the 
World Commission on Dams (WCD)—have a mutualistic relationship with public 
participation; meaningful implementation of one element will inherently benefit 
the other, making both valuable tools for targeting hydropower externalities.21 Af-
ter a two-year study, the WCD recognized that large dams were often riddled with 
steep social and environmental costs borne by displaced peoples, downstream 
communities, taxpayers, and the environment itself that were outweighed by pur-
ported social benefits.22 The study emphasized, “the end [that] any dam project 
[achieves] must be the sustainable improvement of human welfare . . .  [meaning] 
a significant advance of human development on a basis that is economically viable, 
socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.”23 Failures during the planning 
process included issues with participation and transparency, alternatives assess-
ments, environmental impact statements (EIS), and social impact statements being 
                                                          
 16. See Marcia S. Meixler, Mark B. Bain & M. Todd Walter, Predicting Barrier Passage and Habi-
tat Suitability for Migratory Fish Species, 220 ECOLOGICAL MODELING 2782, 2782–83 (2009).  
 17. See BRUCE P. SHOEMAKER, IAN G. BAIRD & KANOKWAN MANORUM, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR RIVER: A 
SURVEY OF RIVER-BASED LIVELIHOODS IN THE XE BANG FAI RIVER BASIN IN CENTRAL LAO PDR 32 (2001).  
 18. Beck et al., supra note 9, at 74.  See generally, PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY 
AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (2001) (discussing wide-ranging ecological and human impacts of large dams, 
including indigenous and subsistence-based communities). 
 19. James G. Workman, How to Fix Our Dam Problems, 24 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 31, 32 (2007); see 
also M. Rhead Enion, Rethinking National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch: The Case for NPDES Regulation of 
Dam Discharge, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 797 (2011) (discussing National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 
1291 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a key case supporting the argument that dam discharges should be subject to NPDES 
permitting). In Gorsuch, the District Court conducted a comprehensive review of water quality impacts from 
dam discharges, holding that they met the CWA’s standard for “discharge of a pollutant” and therefore 
should be subject to NPDES permitting. Id. at 800. The D.C. Circuit reversed on Chevron grounds, holding 
that the district court gave improper deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statutory requirements at 
issue. Id. at 816. However, the D.C. Circuit did not address the district court’s substantive analysis, and both 
the Second and Seventh Circuits have refused to defer to similar arguments. Id. While this is an evolving 
area of statutory interpretation, most discharges from hydroelectric dams have continued to escape regu-
lation under the NPDES program. Id. at 815.  
 20. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (describing “soft law” as a body of law with no general enforcement power, where 
“legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and dele-
gation”). 
 21. WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 2 
(Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2000). 
 22. Id. at xxxi. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
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undertaken late in the process, and monitoring and licensing measures being incon-
sistent or non-existent.24 
The WCD suggested a number of guidelines to help balance equities within 
large dam projects, such as engaging in participatory and multi-criteria analysis of 
development needs, options and impacts, conducting regular monitoring and peri-
odic review, ensuring displaced people’s livelihoods are improved, and creating en-
forcement mechanisms and incentives in the area of social and environmental per-
formance.25 Unfortunately, these types of soft law incentives look good on paper 
but prove difficult to implement on large-scale hydropower projects, such as Belo 
Monte. Powerful political and economic interests can push development forward, 
skirting laws and regulations and ignoring public participation, socio-economic im-
pacts, and environmental degradation.26 Developing nations, such as Brazil, often 
place a higher value on economic development at the cost of the environment—a 
relationship exacerbated by inefficient accountability and enforcement mecha-
nisms throughout the regulatory process. 27 Sustainable development initiatives, 
such as those proposed by the WCD, have catalyzed research efforts and increased 
awareness surrounding the impacts of hydropower, particularly regarding the role 
of public participation.28 However, most of these initiatives have not had the stop-
ping power or support to have a tangible impact on hydropower projects and their 
associated externalities.29 
Intermediaries—third-party financial and governance institutions—can play 
an important role in helping curb the social and environmental externalities of hy-
dropower developments.30 While much of Belo Monte’s funding is national,31 inter-
mediaries such as the World Bank can often use their financial power over develop-
ing nations to break through the politics surrounding development projects. 
Uganda’s Bujagali Dam exemplifies this practice in action. Much of the project’s 
funding came from intermediaries, including the World Bank and European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB).32 The EIB conditioned its $130 million funding on completion of a 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 254.  
 25. Id. at 285. 
 26. Simone Athayde, Introduction: Indigenous Peoples, Dams and Resistance in Brazilian Amazo-
nia, 12 TIPITÍ: J. SOC’Y FOR ANTHROPOLOGY LOWLAND S. AM. 80, 82 (2014). 
 27. Marcus W. Beck et al., supra note 9, at 84. 
 28. Id. at 78.  
 29. Id. at 80.  
 30. See generally WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, supra note 21, at 171–73 (discussing role of interme-
diaries).   
 31. See BNDES Approves Unprecedented Loan for Controversial Amazon Dam, INT’L RIVERS (Nov. 
29, 2012), https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/bndes-approves-unprecedented-loan-for-con-
troversial-amazon-dam-7749 (noting that Belo Monte’s funding is primarily allocated through the Brazilian 
National Development Bank, which limits financial pressures that intermediaries such as the World Bank 
can exert over the project itself). 




122 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 55 
 
satisfactory environmental and social analysis.33 Intermediaries and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGO) worked together in developing external accountability 
frameworks targeting social and environmental impacts stemming from the Bu-
jagali project, ultimately delaying its construction until the government conducted 
further consultation with impacted parties.34 Accordingly, intermediaries can help 
introduce accountability and participation mechanisms into the development pro-
cess by holding the borrowing nation accountable for its actions and mandating 
higher social and/or environmental standards.35 
C. Public Participation 
i. Foundations and Importance 
Public participation is an important element of good governance in environ-
mental decision-making.36 Defined as the involvement of stakeholders in adminis-
trative functions and decision-making, 37  promoting public engagement fosters 
transparency and accountability in government, whereby a wider base of 
knowledge and opinions can interact to make informed and inclusive decisions.38 
This participation assists decision makers in understanding the nature of public 
opinion and improves decisions by providing relevant and accurate information as 
well as evidence related to a proposed action.39 Moreover, robust public participa-
tion aids in highlighting the true substance and significance underlying the politics 
of stakeholder concerns about a proposed government action, thereby providing a 
more meaningful instrument for advancing policy on substantive environmental is-
sues.40 The transparency and accountability in government that results from vigor-
ous participation, simultaneously confers legitimacy upon governmental processes 
and may help counter corruption.41 Timing, however, is critical when examining the 
ability for the public to engage, as the participation mechanism must be able to 
affect the process and in turn, the outcome, in order to deliver meaningful social 
benefits.42 
                                                          
 33. See id. 
 34. David Ross Olanya, Dams, Water and Accountability in Uganda, in LAND AND HYDROPOLITICS IN 
THE NILE RIVER BASIN: CHALLENGES AND NEW INVESTMENTS, EARTHSCAN STUDIES IN WATER RESOURCE MGMT. 156–57 
(2016). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New Mil-
lennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 266 (1999).  
 37. XiaoHu Wang & Montgomery van Wart, When Public Participation in Administration Leads 
to Trust: An Empirical Assessment of Managers’ Perceptions, 67 PUB. ADMIN. R. 265, 271 (2007). 
 38. Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China’s EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VERMONT J. ENVTL. 
L. 281, 286 (2007); see also Wang & van Wart, supra note 37, at 271. 
 39. Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions: Evolving Ob-
stacles and Potential Solutions Rough Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 165 
(2009); see also Renée A. Irvin & John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the 
Effort?, 64 PUB. ADMIN. R. 55, 56–58 (2004). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; Moorman & Ge, supra note 38, at 287. 
 42. Mihaly, supra note 39, at 164–65. 
 
2019 DAMNESIA: AN EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
AND EVOLVING APPROACHES TO HYDROPOWER 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 
123 
 
On the other hand, critics argue that public participation merely gets in the 
way of good science and is an ineffective time and resource sink.43 Others have 
characterized public participation as a tool to “channel and contain citizen de-
mands, delay difficult decisions, or build support for agency plans.”44 However, of-
tentimes experts and officials need citizen input to illuminate the facets of a given 
impact or problem that may not be obvious from an external perspective.45 Strong 
partnerships between citizens, experts, and advocates provide valuable data and 
opportunities for collaborative analysis on a given project.46 This is particularly true 
in ideologically charged, or possibly corrupt regimes where the government, its 
agencies, or elected officials value economically dominant stakeholders over sound 
science and good governance.47 Brazil fits this mold, as well as some state and local 
governments in the United States.48 
Numerous empirical studies have attested to the public participation’s impact 
on governmental decision-making.49 One study highlights a relationship between 
public participation mechanisms and trust in government decision-making, finding 
that increased participation mechanisms improve public trust when producing high-
quality services that the public desires and enhancing ethical behavior of govern-
ment administrations.50 This study also concluded that there was a strong positive 
association between participation and government accountability, emphasizing the 
value of public participation as a mechanism for promoting accountability.51 
In addition to written comments, public meetings have been shown to help 
citizens provide more constructive feedback in the decision-making process, in turn 
enhancing the responsiveness and accountability of government.52 Implementing 
additional deliberation structures within public meetings allows citizens to lobby 
government officials, increasing citizen’s political power and incentivizing govern-
ment responsiveness to their concerns.53 In sum, open forums for citizen participa-
tion enhance the legitimacy of the political process and the government’s decision-
making authority.54 
                                                          
 43. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 33−39 (Harv. 
Univ. Press, 1993); Irvin & Stansbury, supra note 39, at 58−60. 
 44. Caron Chess & Kristen Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What 
Works?, 33 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2685, 2685 (1999) (quoting B.J. Checkoway, The Politics of Public Hearings, 17 
J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 566 (1981)). 
 45. See Mihaly, supra note 39, at 160. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally Chess & Purcell, supra note 44, at 2691; Brian Adams, Public Meetings and the 
Democratic Process, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 43 (2004); Irvin & Stansbury, supra note 39; Wang & van Wart, 
supra note 37.   
 50. See Wang & van Wart, supra note 37, at 276. 
 51. See id. at 275. 
 52. See Adams, supra note 49, at 52. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
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Chess and Purcell evaluated twelve preceding studies on the effectiveness of 
public meetings.55 The evaluation concluded that a majority of studies found that 
public meetings influenced government decision-making.56 Further, public partici-
pation impacted not only decisions specific to the meetings, but also subsequent 
institutional changes that impacted other participation mechanisms.57 The study 
synthesized the empirical evidence into a number of “rules of thumb” for successful 
public participation mechanisms, including clarification of goals, advanced planning 
early in the regulatory process, varying forms of participation and collecting feed-
back on participation efforts.58 
Moreover, public participation in governance can be a transformative force 
whereby the individuals participating in governmental decision-making experience 
permanent changes in their outlook and shift broader societal perspectives.59 En-
trenched stakeholders often minimize their view of environmental externalities 
through a dominant influence over the legal or regulatory process.60 But, meaning-
ful public participation can provide mechanisms for impacted groups to break the 
status quo and advocate for a social good (i.e. addressing a hydropower externality) 
that is not otherwise adequately represented amongst current organized inter-
ests.61 In sum, open and meaningful participation mechanisms in the environmen-
tal decision making process help foster an informed citizenry, a transparent and ac-
countable government, and overall higher quality decision making related to the 
environment.62 
ii. Making Public Participation “Meaningful” 
Public participation has inherent value in environmental decision-making, but 
there is a stark contrast between participation that is “meaningful” and participa-
tion that is merely “due” under the law. Oftentimes all that is guaranteed under the 
law is the opportunity to be heard, not a result.63 Finding ways for regulators and 
lawmakers to make participation mechanisms meaningful is crucial in addressing 
hydropower externalities. This section will focus on three key mechanisms for mak-
ing public participation more meaningful: (1) access to and the quality of infor-
mation, (2) timing, and (3) accountability in the regulatory and legal process.64 
Increasing access to and the quality of information related to a project is one 
mechanism for achieving more meaningful public participation.65 Access to infor-
mation is a necessary element in allowing stakeholders to be informed about the 
                                                          
 55. See Chess & Purcell, supra note 44, at 2687. 
 56. See id. at 2686. 
 57. See id. at 2687. 
 58. See id. at 2691. 
 59. Mihaly, supra note 39, at 162. 
 60. See id. at 163. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Moorman & Ge, supra note 38, at 286. 
 63. Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the Environment, 10 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 683, 691 (1993). 
 64. This list is non-exhaustive. There are a multitude of important considerations in making pub-
lic participation more meaningful. This Article is focusing on the listed three given their heightened rele-
vance and importance in the examined case studies and the hydropower context generally. 
 65. See Popovic, supra note 63, at 691. 
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nature of the government’s action, which is critical in mounting potential legal chal-
lenges.66 Obtaining information subject to a direct request in one mode for the pub-
lic to examine the data underlying the government’s decision-making process.67 But 
access must go beyond mere responses to requests. Understanding and accommo-
dating barriers to information distribution and formulating more effective means of 
access to information promotes more effective and meaningful participation.68 As 
examined later with indigenous peoples impacted by Belo Monte, failing to account 
for cultural and language barriers can reduce a public participation effort to a mere 
box on a project’s regulatory checklist. Meaningful public participation needs to be 
inclusive, encompassing the full spectrum of impacted, interested and represented 
parties related to the decision.69 Participation mechanisms are ineffective when the 
underlying information is not comprehensive enough for the public to make mean-
ingful determinations and comments about the proposed actions.70 Accordingly, in-
formation should be available at a low cost, at accessible locations, and in electronic 
form. 
Timing is another critical mechanism for facilitating meaningful public partici-
pation. Public participation itself must be able to affect the process and outcome, 
ultimately delivering a benefit to the impacted party.71 Participation, therefore, 
needs to be conducted at a stage in the regulatory process where meaningful inter-
action on a project’s merits can still occur. A process that fails to impact an outcome 
epitomizes public participation that is merely “due” rather than participation that 
is meaningful and effective. Jumping through regulatory hoops may fulfill a statu-
tory requirement, but ultimately is relegating the participation mechanism to a for-
mality as opposed to a meaningful opportunity for the public to participate in envi-
ronmental decision-making. Public comments on a proposed hydropower license, 
for example, are meaningless if the agency in question has already granted access 
rights to a developer in order to start construction. Participation that is not mean-
ingful largely is ineffective and fails to meet its core functions.72 It does not advance 
the interests of stakeholders or impacted parties, nor provide useful evidence to 
the decision-makers who are seeking the public interest.73 It does not legitimize the 
concerns of impacted parties nor create significant avenues for fostering civic val-
ues and addressing environmental externalities.74 Meaningful and effective public 
participation must be conducted at a time when change to the underlying action is 
                                                          
 66. Spyke, supra note 36, at 293.   
 67. See generally Christopher M. Johnson, Defining the Content of the Right to Information, 
SIERRA CLUB LEGAL DEF. FUND (1992). 
 68. See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008). 
 69. See generally Spyke, supra note 36, at 268 (discussing expansive forms of public participa-
tion). 
 70. Id. at 293 (discussing data and technology). 
 71. See Mihaly, supra note 39, at 166; see also Chess & Purcell, supra note 44, at 2691. 
 72. Mihaly, supra note 39, at 155. 
 73. See Chess & Purcell, supra note 44, at 2685–86 (discussing process goals rather than out-
come participation). 
 74. See Mihaly, supra note 39, at 166. 
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still possible and there are enforceable legal rights in play. The timing component 
emphasizes a core reason underlying public participation’s importance in environ-
mental decision-making; the reason public participation is important to begin with 
is because it helps regulatory decision makers achieve better results. 
The final mechanism discussed in this paper is accountability. Meaningful pub-
lic participation requires statutory underpinnings that facilitate interaction with 
regulatory decision makers throughout the regulatory process, along with legal en-
forcement mechanisms when the process is inadequate.75 Accountability has sig-
nificant value in the hydropower context, where development projects often have 
far reaching social, economic, and environmental impacts. Honing in on Environ-
mental Impact Assessments (EIAs), such as those mandated by the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), provide a specific example of why public participation 
is important. The NEPA puts a limitation on the government’s discretion in environ-
mental decision-making. An agency’s requirement to take a “hard look” at environ-
mental impacts from a planned action and to consider alternatives provides a stat-
utory hook for enforcing government accountability while simultaneously placing a 
check on agency capture by industry or political majority.76 Greater involvement in 
the EIA process helps educate and inform the public while simultaneously providing 
an outlet to discuss controversial elements of a project early on. EIAs are, in a broad 
sense, an attempt to examine and document impacts from a proposed project and 
its alternatives for the purpose of increasing the quality of human life.77 Adjudica-
tory mechanisms in bodies of environmental law facilitate meaningful participation 
by allowing both the general public and experts to interact with regulatory decision 
makers, the development project, and ultimately the project’s impacts and exter-
nalities. The importance of public participation and effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms cannot be overstated; these have and continue to play an integral role 
in helping the law adapt to meet its intended goals. 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 
A. The United States 
After a period of explosive growth in dam construction, the United States is 
now shifting into a period of dam removal and decommission.78 This is due partly 
to increased awareness regarding the environmental and social impacts of dams 
made possible by the well-established cadre of statues, regulatory agencies, and 
advocacy groups with the power to drive meaningful change.79 
                                                          
 75. See id. at 166–67.  
 76. See J. William Futrell, Environmental Assessment: The Necessary First Step in Successful Envi-
ronmental Strategies, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 234, 237 (1991); Popovic, supra note 63, at 701–02. 
 77. Moorman & Ge, supra note 38, at 286. 
 78. See generally Tarlock, supra note 6, at 1725–26 (discussing the disfavoring of hydropower as 
a source of renewable energy); Blumm & Nadol, supra note 6, at 117–24 (discussing examples of dam re-
moval and decommissioning).   
 79. See generally, e.g., Blumm & Nadol, supra note 6 (discussing statutes and litigation in the 
Columbia River Basin). 
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) outlines mandatory environ-
mental considerations that federal agencies must observe, including the Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) and mandatory public comment periods for exam-
ining proposed agency actions.80 The NEPA has been an invaluable tool for increas-
ing transparency, accountability, and public participation in agency actions impact-
ing the environment.81 
While sharing similar EIS requirements with NEPA, the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) is not solely procedural and provides more enforcement mechanisms against 
violators. Although often politicized, the ESA has unique potential to protect endan-
gered and threatened species and their ecosystems. 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) and its licensing protocols have become increas-
ingly relevant in the age of dam decommission, specifically in protecting riverine 
ecosystems such as the Columbia River Basin in the pacific northwest.82 Historic 
tribal rights and regulatory authority have also played an integral role in shaping 
the way regulatory and legal regimes in the United States interact with impacted 
peoples and address hydropower externalities.83 
The following sections examine how these unique regulatory structures pro-
vide accountability, enforcement, and licensing measures to address historic issues 
with dams, albeit with their own embedded set of roadblocks and challenges. 
i. The National Environmental Policy Act 
Environmental Impact Assessments are a nexus between social, environmen-
tal, and economic values both for the government and the public.84 EIAs were first 
implemented in the United States in 1969 through the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act.85 Touted as “the national charter for protection of the environment,”86 
NEPA seeks to balance environmental concerns in policymaking by mandating that 
all federal agencies “create and maintain conditions under which man and nature 
can exist in productive harmony.”87 Unlike substantive statutes such as the Clean 
Water Act, the NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural, designed to ensure a 
“fully informed and well-considered decision,” but not necessarily a decision a re-
viewing court would have reached.88 “[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject 
to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for the court is to ensure the 
                                                          
 80. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2018). 
 81. See Moorman & Ge, supra note 38, at 287–89. 
 82. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 6, at 112–16 (discussing litigation surrounding the FERC’s 
interpretation of the Federal Power Act).  
 83. See Mason Morisset et al., Tribal Interests, Instream Flows & Hydropower Licensing: Using 
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agency considered the environmental consequences,” not to interject itself within 
the area of discretion reserved for the executive.89 NEPA’s goal is not to prevent an 
agency from taking a proposed action, but rather to force federal agencies to con-
template the environmental impacts of their actions before implementation. 
NEPA’s keystone requirement is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 
An EIS is required when a proposed major federal action will significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment.90 Agencies must conduct an initial Environmen-
tal Assessment (EA) to determine the nature and impact of the proposed action and 
whether or not it will require a more comprehensive EIS.91 The EA must include the 
reason for the proposed action, its environmental impacts, and alternatives to tak-
ing the action.92 If the EA determines that there will be “no significant impact,” then 
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and an EIS is not re-
quired.93 On the other hand, if the EA determines that an EIS is required through 
finding of a significant impact, the agency must publish a Notice of Intent (NOI) to 
prepare an EIS in the Federal Register.94 
Pursuant to NEPA, federal actions that will have a significant impact on the 
environment must undergo the EIS or “detailed statement.”95 The EIS has a variety 
of specific requirements, notable ones being: (1) the purpose and need for the pro-
posed action, (2) alternatives including the proposed action, (3) the affected envi-
ronment, and (4) the environmental consequences of the proposed action.96 Public 
participation is an integral part of the NEPA and the EIS procedure; an agency pre-
paring the EIS must submit the draft statement for a public comment period.97 Pub-
lic comment periods, in particular, are crucial in bridging the gap between a mere 
recitation of scientific studies or results and meaningful participation related to on-
the-ground concerns of stakeholders.98 
One double-edged aspect of the NEPA framework is that agencies retain au-
tonomy in promulgating regulations. The public comment period gives citizens, 
stakeholders, and industry groups a chance to weigh in on the proposed action. 
While the agency does have to address all significant comments, it is not forced to 
accept them and can still proceed with the environmentally harmful proposed ac-
tion if it so chooses. This opens up an avenue for citizens to challenge the agency 
action in federal court, where the judiciary makes a determination about whether 
or not the rule was just and reasonable in light of the factual record. NEPA’s proce-
dural nature often puts meaningful participation into question, as stakeholders can 
lose the ability to directly influence the political or environmental impacts of the 
project in question when procedure itself is the focus rather than public concerns 
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about the legal and cultural disputes surrounding environmental issues.99 In other 
words, the government is obligated to engage in public participation, but all the law 
provides is a right to be heard, not a result. 
Maintaining public scrutiny as a core component to NEPA’s implementation 
and ensures that the public is receiving high quality information in a timely manner 
while simultaneously providing them with a forum to interact with agency lawmak-
ers and the proposed action itself.100 The ability to interact with the decision-mak-
ing process at significant regulatory junctures helps create meaningful participation 
with the potential to influence a result in the process or outcome.101 The NEPA’s 
notice requirements enable the public to interact with a proposed federal action 
regardless of whether an EIS is needed, giving citizen groups alternative avenues for 
targeting a development project by forcing agencies to take a hard look at the po-
tential for environmental impacts in addition to existing statutory requirements.102 
Ensuring this level of transparency is critical in maintaining effective dispute resolu-
tion frameworks, particularly when it comes to environmental externalities. Dams 
often require resettlement of peoples, making their participation in decisions highly 
relevant. 
The administrative system is a careful framework of checks and balances; the 
NEPA and the EIS fit well within this structure, allowing agencies to take beneficial 
actions and citizens to get the information they need to provide meaningful input 
and legal challenges. As exemplified below,103 the opacity of Brazil’s EIA process, in 
contrast, has led to a host of accountability issues surrounding both EIA require-
ments and socio-environmental impacts stemming from Belo Monte. 
ii. The Endangered Species Act 
Managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and, in some cases, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the primary goal of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) is to protect the ecosystem and habitats where en-
dangered species live. Section 4 of the ESA outlines the listing process by which a 
species becomes protected by the federal law.104 The decision to list is based solely 
                                                          
 99. See Kelsey Kahn, NEPA’s Fatal Flaw, an Impediment to Collaboration, UNIV. UTAH COLL. L., 
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on scientific data; economic, social, and political effects are not considered in the 
listing process.105 Once listed, the FWS must designate a critical habitat for the spe-
cies.106 Unlike the listing process, the critical habitat designation considers the best 
available science and any other relevant impacts, including economic, social, and 
political.107 
Section 1536 of the ESA establishes procedures for interagency cooperation 
and consultation.108 The federal government is prohibited from jeopardizing the 
continued existence of a species and from adversely modifying its designated criti-
cal habitat.109 Any agency action that will jeopardize a species or its critical habitat 
must undergo an EIS procedure similar to the NEPA, requiring further information 
disclosures and public comment periods and creating additional layers of account-
ability within the regulatory framework.110 The EIS requires considering alternatives 
to the project and examining how the environment will be affected.111 If an impact 
is potentially significant, the agency must conduct a Biological Assessment to deter-
mine whether there will be an adverse habitat modification or jeopardy to the spe-
cies.112 
iii. Tribal Regulatory Authority, FERC, and the Federal Power Act 
Tribal regulatory authority and reserved rights stem primarily from the 1908 
reserved rights doctrine, established by the United States Supreme Court in Winters 
v. United States.113 In effect, the reserved rights doctrine states that when granting 
reservation lands to tribes, the federal government impliedly grants access to water 
reserves adequate to support the purpose of the reservation.114 Additional tribal 
authority originates from the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in United States v. 
Winans, where the Yakima Tribe’s “right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed 
places” impliedly reserved the right of access to fishing grounds through private 
property.115 Pursuant to Winans, tribally reserved rights are “necessarily and im-
pliedly reserved by the tribes in order to give effect to their treaty rights.”116 While 
related, Winters and Winans rights are distinct. Winters rights are primarily re-
served waters rights created when the federal government creates an Indian reser-
vation.117 Winans rights are broader in scope, encompassing rights that are im-
pliedly reserved by tribes through continued exercise of their treaty rights.118 
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The Federal Power Act of 1935 governs the construction and operations of all 
non-federal hydroelectric projects in the United States.119 Under the FPA, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the power to license all non-federal 
hydropower operations on navigable waters of the United States.120 All non-federal 
dams require a license to operate with a term of fifty years or less.121 The FPA offers 
little guidance on actions surrounding dam decommission, reflecting the past belief 
that operating a dam would always be in the public’s best interest. 122  Recent 
amendments to the FPA have created new opportunities for addressing hydro-
power externalities. 123  The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA) 
amended the FPA and mandated that the FERC weigh the benefits of relicensing a 
project against “the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish 
and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat).”124 Unlike the ESA, 
the ECPA provisions apply regardless of whether the FERC-licensed project will jeop-
ardize a listed species.125 
Tribal regulatory authority surrounding hydropower often interacts with the 
FERC’s licensure procedures, the Federal Power Act, and numerous other federal 
statutes, such as the Clean Water Act and the ESA.126 Pursuant to the Federal Power 
Act, when issuing a hydropower license, the FERC is required to include permit con-
ditions “to adequately, and equitably protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance 
fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat)” impacted by the 
hydropower project.127 These conditions must be based on federal and state fish 
and wildlife agency recommendations submitted pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act.128 Tribes with natural resource interests can also utilize these 
statutes to gain status in the process.129 FERC must also require the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of any federally mandated fishways on licensed dams, 
the basis of which is subject to public comment.130 The FERC’s obligations surround-
ing fishways have provided additional statutory hooks for legal challenges to dam 
licensure and re-licensure under both the NEPA and the ESA.131 Perhaps most im-
portantly, the FERC can only issue a hydropower project license on a federal reser-
vation if the agency finds that the license will not be inconsistent with or otherwise 
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interfere with the purpose for which the reservation was created or acquired.132 
The FERC’s prominent role in dam licensing presents a number of unique opportu-
nities to utilize the licensing or relicensing process to mitigate environmental exter-
nalities stemming from non-federal hydropower projects.133 
The flexibility built into legal and regulatory regimes in the United States has 
enabled adaptation to address complex environmental problems over time. Specif-
ically, public participation has evolved into a crucial component in the core environ-
mental statues surrounding hydropower development. Access to information un-
derlying the government’s decisions, the ability to intervene at critical junctures in 
the regulatory process, and effective accountability mechanisms for when the pro-
cess fails have together enabled participation mechanisms in the United States to 
be meaningful in addressing hydropower externalities. 
B. Brazil 
On paper, Brazilian regulatory regimes have many similar elements to their 
U.S. counterparts, such as frameworks for licensing, EIAs, and public comment pe-
riods. In practice, however, Brazil’s legal structures, enforcement mechanisms, and 
avenues for public participation differ vastly in depth, function, and accountability 
from those in the United States. These differences and the impact they have on 
addressing hydropower externalities are crucial given the socio-economic impacts 
at stake in the Amazon. This section will examine core components of the Brazilian 
legal and regulatory system relating to hydropower development, their associated 
impacts, and various elements of public participation within the system. 
Many relevant environmental provisions and protections are included in the 
Brazilian Constitution, including a specific right to an environment that is “an asset 
of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life,”134 along with a right to 
take legal action to nullify acts harmful to the environment.135 Publicly available en-
vironmental impact assessments are also codified in the Brazilian Constitution.136 
The National Environmental Policy establishes a host of agencies and regulatory 
bodies with the power to enforce regulations and promulgate rules regarding the 
environment.137 
Brazil’s environmental laws were largely created through the 1981 National 
Environmental Policy (NEP), with the goal of “preserving, improving and recovering 
the environmental quality conducive of a healthy life, with a view to ensuring socio-
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economic development, the interests of national security and the protection of hu-
man life.”138 The NEP specified twelve instruments for accomplishing its goals, in-
cluding defining environmental quality standards, zoning, licensing, conducting en-
vironmental impact assessments, and establishing areas for conservation and 
preservation. 139  The NEP also established the National Environment System 
(NAENVSYS), a collective body that brings together all environmental agencies in 
the Union to carry out the norms of the Brazilian Federal Constitution.140 The lead-
ing administrative body under NAENVSYS is the National Government Council, 
which reports to the Brazilian president and is responsible for developing guidelines 
and environmental policies. 141 Subsequent administrative agencies included the 
National Environment Council (NAENVCO), the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), 
and, lastly, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(IBAMA).142 
Many of the environmental and administrative concerns surrounding Belo 
Monte have centered on the actions of the IBAMA, specifically the IBAMA’s licens-
ing process for hydropower projects.143 The Federal Constitution mandates an En-
vironmental Impact Assessment (EIA) followed by a corresponding Environmental 
Impact Report (RIMA) for any projects or activities with the potential to cause sig-
nificant environmental harm.144 The EIA, which is conducted by the entity propos-
ing the development and subsequently analyzed by the IBAMA,145 includes an envi-
ronmental diagnosis, analysis of environmental impacts, mitigation measures for 
addressing negative impacts, and monitoring protocols for supervising impacts.146 
The RIMA reflects the conclusions from the EIA and addresses specifics of the de-
velopment project, including its justification, potential alternatives, and probable 
environmental impacts.147 
Brazil’s EIA requirements differ greatly from those outlined in NEPA. The fact 
that the developer conducts the EIA calls into question the accuracy, impartiality, 
and transparency of data underlying proposed projects, which, in turn, can limit the 
value of the EIA’s participation mechanisms. Further, having the regulated party 
conduct the requisite EIA puts the government one step further away from true 
accountability, making legal challenges more convoluted. While the IBAMA’s EIAs 
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are subject to legal challenge and publicly available pursuant to the Brazilian Con-
stitution,148 ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms in conjunction with anemic 
regulatory accountability mechanisms have trivialized public participation mecha-
nisms surrounding Belo Monte’s EIA.149 
The IBAMA implements a three-stage process for licensing development pro-
jects.150 The first stage is a Preliminary License, granted for a maximum of five years 
during the planning stages;151 the IBAMA analyzes the EIA and RIMA at this stage to 
evaluate the environmental feasibility of the project and whether the application is 
in accordance with existing environmental legislation.152 Next, the project must re-
ceive an Installation License authorizing development in accordance with specifica-
tions in the approved plans, including reduction of negative impacts stated in the 
EIA.153 Lastly, the project receives an Operating License authorizing operation of the 
development project after confirmation that previous licensing conditions have 
been met.154 
Notably, none of these licensure stages offers an opportunity for the public to 
comment or interact with the government’s decision-making process. The mere ex-
istence of these regulations shows that social and environmental externalities are 
being considered to some extent, but the lack of meaningful mechanisms to partic-
ipate throughout the development life-cycle and licensing process limits the im-
pacted parties’ ability to effect real change. 155 There are also serious concerns 
about transparency within the regulatory process given that Belo Monte’s Prelimi-
nary License was granted in the face of at least forty serious socio-environmental 
concerns identified during the EIA and licensure process.156 
The World Bank published a three-volume study on environmental licensing 
projects in Brazil, highlighting a number of changes that could be made to improve 
the process. 157  The study recognized that many EIAs submitted as part of the 
IBAMA’s licensing procedures were of poor quality and evaluated unevenly.158 In-
creased public participation at these early stages of development could, over time, 
aid in forming a more predictable and transparent framework for licensing and EIA 
protocols.159 More effective dispute resolution mechanisms within the EIA and li-
censing process could also help incentivize more meaningful public participation.160 
While U.S. statutes such as the NEPA and the ESA certainly are not panaceas for 
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addressing environmental concerns, they nonetheless provide valuable frameworks 
for meaningful and comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms that provide 
more than a mere right to be heard. Robust dispute resolution mechanisms can 
increase avenues for government accountability and meaningful public participa-
tion within the legal and regulatory system, ultimately mitigating more environ-
mental impacts.161 As discussed below, legal challenges can be mounted at various 
stages of the Brazilian regulatory process, but these opportunities are hardly meaning-
ful or relevant in the face of the entrenched political support. 
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s (MP) office plays a key role in Brazil’s environ-
mental regulatory system. According to a World Bank study on environmental li-
censing in Brazil, the MP “possesses the best educated staff, significant resources 
and a broad mandate” to influence issues that do not fall explicitly within their legal 
jurisdiction, such as defining the national energy matrix and establishing economic 
and environmental priorities.162 Some elements of the MP’s broad, autonomous 
powers extend beyond those of the Brazilian judiciary.163 The MP has been de-
scribed as a “fourth branch” of Brazilian government tasked with increasing govern-
ment accountability in a sluggish and overwhelmed judicial system.164 The Brazilian 
judiciary itself plays an important role in the Belo Monte conflict, having both issued 
and revoked crucial injunctions on the development project.165 Most of the Belo 
Monte litigation has been filed in the judicial system by the MP.166 Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality challenges (ADINs) receive priority and are sent directly to the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF), the highest level of the Brazilian judiciary.167 The 
MP is one of a limited pool of state and professional institutions allowed to file 
ADINs, accounting for approximately 15% of total ADINs filed.168 
Indigenous peoples have a variety of protections recognized under Brazilian 
law. Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution, promulgated in 1988, specifies, “[a]ll 
people are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever.”169 Article 
231, paragraph 3, recognizes specific indigenous rights related to hydropower ac-
tivities through a mandatory public consultation process between Brazil’s National 
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Congress and communities involved or affected by developmental activities.170 Es-
tablished in 1967, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is the Brazilian govern-
ment body tasked with developing and implementing policies related to indigenous 
peoples, including public participation mechanisms.171 The FUNAI was responsible 
for conducting a study on the social and environmental impacts of the Belo Monte 
development projects.172 While not formally part of Brazil’s legal system, Brazil is 
also subject to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR).173 As discussed below, the IACHR has played an important role in lending 
a voice to indigenous communities impacted by Belo Monte as they struggle to ex-
ercise their rights to participate and be heard under Brazilian law.174 
Brazil has also ratified the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples in Independent Countries in 2002 (ILO Convention 169).175 Brazil’s ratification 
of ILO Convention 169 is notable; it mandates a consultation process with indige-
nous communities regarding activities or legal measures that directly impact their 
lives or livelihoods.176 While agreement does not need to be reached, it must be 
“undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the 
objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”177 As dis-
cussed above, international legal bodies and development initiatives have been in-
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IV. CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROCESS-BASED RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
A. Brazil 
Despite having well-established regulatory regimes and a judiciary capable of 
enforcing them, Brazilian law has struggled to cope with the vast externalities im-
posed by the Belo Monte dam project. As discussed above, Brazilian law has many 
similar elements to its U.S. counterparts.178 Actions impacting the environment are 
required to undergo an EIA, whose results must be made publicly available. 179 
Agency actions can be challenged in courts, but the judiciary itself has been incon-
sistent in applying and enforcing regulatory requirements. With domestic legal chal-
lenges failing to address the serious socio-environmental impacts with Belo Monte, 
impacted peoples have turned to international law. Unfortunately, third-party ac-
tors have limited influence over the Brazilian government, particularly when Belo 
Monte itself is nationally funded. Despite being available under Brazilian law, ac-
countability, public participation, and dispute resolution mechanisms are failing to 
force the law to meet its stated purpose. This section will examine public participa-
tion mechanisms in the context of the IBAMA’s EIA and licensure process and indig-
enous peoples’ struggle to be heard under Brazilian and International law. 
i. Licensing and Litigation Within the IBAMA 
The Belo Monte development officially began moving forward in July of 2005, 
with the Brazilian Congress passing a decree authorizing the project to move into 
indigenous areas contingent upon completion of an anthropological study of the 
project’s impact.180 Licensing programs formally began in 2006, continuing through 
2011, but notably stopping in March 2006 and starting again in February 2007 due 
to legal challenges in the courts.181 The EIAs were first presented to the IBAMA in 
July of 2008, although consultation with indigenous groups did not occur until after 
the EIAs had been completed.182 Three separate injunctions were ordered and sub-
sequently overturned between 2008 and 2009, the main concerns being issues with 
the EIA and lack of consultation with local communities.183 The IBAMA granted Belo 
Monte’s Preliminary License in February 2010, despite acknowledging more than 
forty serious socio-environmental concerns identified with the project.184 Two sen-
ior IBAMA officials resigned in 2009 and two IBAMA Presidents resigned in 2010 and 
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2011, respectively.185 Each of these individuals cited high-level political pressure as 
the reason for their resignation.186 The Brazilian Federal Court again halted work on 
the dam in August 2012 on the grounds that indigenous peoples had not been con-
sulted—the Supreme Federal Court overturned the decision a mere two weeks 
later.187 
Despite having a seemingly well-established environmental regulatory regime 
and judicial system, there is little accountability throughout the process. Transpar-
ency and accountability are critical in supporting effective dispute resolution frame-
works and giving the public avenues for challenging and evaluating government ac-
tions.188 Project injunctions have been ordered and dismissed in two-week time 
frames, a feat unheard of in the U.S. court system. While the EIA was completed, 
there was incomplete information regarding potential impacts and mitigation 
measures, both of which are a required aspect of the EIA.189 International organiza-
tions such as the World Bank have described the Brazilian EIAs as poor in quality, 
with uneven evaluation by the government.190 Belo Monte’s license was approved 
by the IBAMA, despite a cadre of serious environmental and human rights concerns; 
existing dispute resolution mechanisms are unable to effect meaningful change. 
While there are some avenues for challenging administrative decisions and public 
participation in the EIA process, it is not recognized or enforced to the same extent 
as, for example, the NEPA provisions in the United States. As discussed below, the 
NEPA and the ESA enjoined the operation and final development of a major hydro-
power project over a species of perch.191 Belo Monte has emerged from a firestorm 
of legal challenges and public disputes unscathed. 
Perhaps most importantly, the EIA only looks at the impacts of Belo Monte 
and its immediate inundated zone.192 Belo Monte is a gateway dam—its construc-
tion will pave the way for as many as six other dam projects in the surrounding area, 
including the controversial Altamira Dam.193 Many experts believe that Belo Monte 
cannot function at peak capacity or provide the benefits alleged in the EIS and plan-
ning documents without the construction of subsequent dams.194 This fact is illumi-
nating when comparing Belo Monte to large hydropower projects in the United 
States, particularly in the context of the EIAs and public participation. After a series 
of cases surrounding the NEPA requirements, the Ninth Circuit held in Thomas v. 
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Peterson that a federal agency must prepare a single EIS for “connected” and “cu-
mulative” actions to determine whether the proposed action will significantly affect 
the quality of the human environment.195 In functioning as a gateway dam, Belo 
Monte is “connected” as the cornerstone dam in the government’s aggregate hy-
dropower plan for the Amazon. Belo Monte’s impacts are also “cumulative,” in that 
they will compound significant socio-environmental impacts stemming from all of 
the proposed dams. Under U.S. law, citizens would at the very least be able to bring 
suit against the IBAMA’s EIA protocol, as it does not adequately meet the cumula-
tive impacts doctrine.196 
On other fronts, the Brazilian legal and regulatory regime provides some sem-
blance of data that the public can use to examine the government’s proposed ac-
tion, but there is a sharp disparity in the accountability measures available to citi-
zens. Despite the glaring faults with the government’s EIA process and transpar-
ency, citizens are unable to meaningfully impact the underlying action.197 Compar-
ing accountability and dispute resolution mechanisms within the EIA process 
demonstrates the importance of meaningful public participation in addressing hy-
dropower externalities as opposed to a mere right to be heard under the law. 
It should also be noted that United States is not beholden to hydropower as 
an energy source, whereas 75% of Brazil’s electricity derives from hydropower.198 
There is immense controversy over the actual energy benefits that Belo Monte will 
bring to Brazil and the Amazon region, specifically regarding proposed mitigation 
measures and the dam’s true hydroelectric potential.199 More transparency and ac-
cess to information within the EIA process would enable stakeholders to examine 
the underlying data the government is relying on in its analysis. Access to high qual-
ity data is crucial in allowing the public to make informed comments on the devel-
opment and in holding the government accountable under the law.200 More effec-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms within Brazil’s regulatory process would allow 
citizens to challenge Belo Monte’s feasibility, challenging both its socio-environ-
mental impacts and its proposed alternatives, similar to challenging an agency ac-
tion under NEPA.201 The EIA’s failure to consider the immense impact that subse-
quent dam projects will have both on the environment and on indigenous peoples 
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is tantamount to the government ignoring any and all potential future impacts in 
favor of securing project approval.202 This tunnel-vision approach to dam construc-
tion echoes early hydropower developments in the United States, where serious 
concerns for Native Americans were simply ignored in favor of development.203 
ii. Indigenous Peoples and the IACHR 
Indigenous peoples and local communities have not been granted the full 
scope of their legal rights nor an adequate opportunity for meaningful participation 
in the regulatory and legal proceedings surrounding Belo Monte’s construction.204 
As noted above, provisions in ILO Convention 169 and the Brazilian Constitution 
recognize an independent right to open a meaningful consultation with indigenous 
peoples on decisions affecting their wellbeing.205 Four public hearings were orga-
nized for local communities, however no translators were provided for those indig-
enous peoples who managed to attend, and the vast majority of the approximately 
40,000 peoples adversely impacted by Belo Monte were unable to have their ques-
tions answered.206 The FUNAI also conducted meetings to allegedly consult with in-
digenous peoples. 207 Neither these meetings nor the public hearings were con-
ducted in a free, antecedent, and informed manner.208 Regardless, Article 231 par-
agraph 3 of the Brazilian Constitution stipulates that the National Congress, not the 
FUNAI, must conduct the indigenous people’s consultation process.209 As such, the 
meetings themselves were not fulfilling the government’s constitutional obligations 
to consult with affected indigenous peoples. 
Left with effectively no recourse within the Brazilian legal system and admin-
istrative agencies, local communities, and NGOs pleaded their case to the IACHR.210 
The IACHR granted precautionary measures to the indigenous communities in the 
Xingu River Basin, requesting that the Brazilian government “immediately suspend 
the licensing process for the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant project and stop any 
construction work from moving forward until certain minimum conditions are 
met.”211 The IACHR response mandated the fulfillment of free, informed, and good 
faith consultations and a guarantee that the indigenous communities receive trans-
lated copies of the social and environmental impact statements beforehand, infor-
mation the government had neglected to provide in the initial consultations.212 
Lastly, the IACHR ordered the government to “adopt measures to protect the life 
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and physical integrity of the members of the indigenous peoples in voluntary isola-
tion of the Xingu Basin.”213 
Rather than acknowledge and comply with the IACHR recommendations, the 
Brazilian government opted to suspend its annual contribution to the Commission 
and conduct a Senate vote for a censure against the recommendations.214 The gov-
ernment also threatened to cut funding to the IACHR and to withdraw from the 
organization.215 Two months later, the IBAMA issued Belo Monte’s final construc-
tion permit, incorporating new socio-environmental reasons for approval and stat-
ing that no indigenous peoples would be directly affected. 216  This cuts directly 
against the previous meetings organized by the FUNAI—if indigenous peoples were 
not going to be affected then there would be no reason to engage in a consultation 
process to begin with. The Brazilian government has disregarded the IACHR’s deter-
mination that Belo Monte would have a major impact on the land and livelihood of 
indigenous peoples along with constitutional protections put in place for indigenous 
peoples.217 The construction on Belo Monte began in June 2011, despite a legal 
challenge filed by the MP in Brazil’s eleventh court and the staggering array of socio-
environmental issues listed above.218 
The Belo Monte saga highlights that merely having a right to public participa-
tion is not enough in itself to combat hydropower externalities. Public participation 
is not meaningful when access to the legal and regulatory system is provided at a 
stage where no true impact can be made on the development or when participation 
mechanisms fail to provide basic translation services allowing indigenous peoples 
to interact with the process and information the government is relying upon.219 
Government agencies need to engage in the public participation process with 
proper planning and timing, adequate resources, and an overall commitment to us-
ing the public process to inform their actions.220 Anything less risks public participa-
tion mechanisms not being meaningful or otherwise falling short of their intended 
goals.221 Looking at these difficulties and failures highlights a unique facet in the 
early development of environmental and social issues stemming from large dams: 
once a project gets through its preliminarily technical and economic feasibility pro-
cedures, interest from government, industry or other powerful interest groups can 
generate immense momentum, thereby steamrolling over further assessments.222 
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This has been particularly evident with the events surrounding Belo Monte. As dis-
cussed in the next section, even the extensive public participation and accountabil-
ity frameworks seen in the United States can fall short in addressing externalities 
when the development is supported by strong political or economic interests. 
B. The United States 
The accountability and flexibility built into legal and regulatory frameworks in 
the United States have enabled the law to adapt and overcome deficiencies in ad-
dressing externalities surrounding hydropower development. The procedural re-
quirements of the NEPA act as a check against agency action through public com-
ment periods and the option for legal challenges in federal court. These require-
ments also allow agencies to hold each other accountable when proposing major 
agency actions. When procedural process is not enough, substantive statutes such 
as the ESA and regulatory frameworks such as the FERC’s relicensing protocols pro-
vide regulatory teeth mandating consideration of environmental impacts stemming 
from hydropower projects.223 Moreover, stakeholder pressure can push Congress 
to update antiquated laws with fresh amendments, opening previously unavailable 
avenues for addressing externalities. The importance of public participation and ef-
fective dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be understated; these have and con-
tinue to play an integral role in helping the law adapt to meet its intended goals. 
This section will analyze the public participation’s role in addressing hydropower 
externalities across a variety of case studies. Beginning with a historical period lack-
ing meaningful public participation for Native Americans, transitioning into historic 
evolutions in the United States’ environmental legal and regulatory regimes, and 
culminating in the creation of new mechanisms for public participation, litigation, 
and environmental management surrounding hydropower projects. 
i. Native Americans and the Historic Struggle to Address Hydropower Externalities 
in the United States 
Throughout the 1800s, Native American tribes ceded millions of acres of land 
to the U.S. government through treaties.224 These land cessations and treaties laid 
the groundwork for decades of conflict over reserved rights, particularly those re-
lated to water usage for hunting and fishing.225 Land cessation also paved the way 
for many of the large hydropower projects that are the focus of this Article.226 
In an 1864 treaty, the Klamath Tribes ceded 90% of their lands—amounting to 
more than 23 million acres—to the United States, while retaining hunting, fishing, 
and gathering rights.227 This land cessation was the foundation for the Klamath Pro-
ject.228 Authorized in 1905, shortly after Congress passed the Reclamation Act,229 
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the Klamath Project was a large-scale water reclamation initiative designed to allo-
cate irrigation water throughout the historically arid region.230 The Klamath Project 
drained numerous lakes designated as National Wildlife Refuges and is closely in-
tertwined with seven large dam development projects constructed between 1902 
and 1967.231 In 1954, Congress terminated the Klamath Tribes’ federal recognition 
via the Termination Act, leading to the sale of valuable forestland on the reserva-
tion, but specifically not abrogating any water rights of these tribes. 232 Federal 
recognition was restored in 1986, but no lands were returned to the tribes.233 
The Warm Springs and Wasco tribes ceded over 10 million acres of traditional 
reservation land in Oregon to the United States government through an 1855 
treaty. 234  Again, these tribes reserved “the exclusive right of taking fish in the 
streams running through and bordering said reservation . . . and at all other usual 
and accustomed stations.”235 The 1941 Grand Coulee Dam devastated salmon runs 
in the Upper Columbia River, creating a barrier to nearly 50% of historic salmon 
spawning grounds. 236 Lower Columbia River runs were similarly impacted, with 
listed species sustaining losses of 35-40% of historic habitat due to hydropower im-
passe.237 
Prior to the evolution of modern environmental law in the 1970s, Native 
American tribes had little to no participation in the legal and regulatory process 
surrounding hydropower outside the reserved rights established in treaties and the 
Winters and Winans decisions.238 This lack of participation was a component in 
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many hydropower projects impacting tribal lands, where tribes with little represen-
tation were forced to bear the social, environmental, and economic costs of devel-
opment with little to no benefit.239 Hydropower projects in the United States have 
historically been conducted with disregard for the vast environmental externalities 
inherent with dams. Lack of meaningful public participation mechanisms, such as 
access to information and regulatory enforcement mechanisms like those found in 
the NEPA, made it nearly impossible for tribal groups to fight hydropower develop-
ments impacting riverine resources and leaving many tribes unable to exercise their 
reserved rights. 
Tribal groups in the United States have experienced many of the same social, 
economic, and environmental externalities that indigenous peoples currently face 
with Belo Monte in Brazil. Lack of meaningful public participation mechanisms is 
only one facet of the problem—generally speaking, the law was unequipped or gov-
erning bodies were simply unwilling to address the complex and far-reaching exter-
nalities inherent with hydropower development. As examined in the next section, 
it took decades for United States law to begin addressing hydropower’s many ex-
ternalities. However, evolving bodies of law is only part of the solution. A common-
ality between early hydropower in the United States and Belo Monte in Brazil is the 
government’s focus on development at the cost of externalities imposed on im-
pacted peoples. Economic and political interests in large hydropower projects con-
tinue to limit the power, impact, and effectiveness of modern environmental pro-
cedures.240 
ii. Modern Environmental Law Brings New Mechanisms to the Fight 
Modern environmental statutes such as NEPA and the ESA heralded in a new 
age for public participation in the hydropower regulatory process.241 While these 
initial environmental laws did not directly target dams and hydropower, the envi-
ronmental and regulatory constraints these statutes imposed made new hydro-
power developments an onerous process. 242  This section examines how policy 
changes in the late twentieth century gradually shifted the emphasis of public de-
bate to the negative impact of dams, whereby public participation mechanisms be-
gan playing a larger role in combatting hydropower externalities through the 
growth of some of the world’s most powerful and comprehensive environmental 
laws.243 
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a. Collaborative Approaches to Addressing Hydropower Externalities 
Bringing public participation mechanisms to the forefront of hydropower de-
velopments was an invaluable step towards meaningful negotiations and collabo-
rative approaches to addressing the environmental externalities of dams, particu-
larly for Native American tribes impacted by hydropower projects. In 1982, the 
Reagan administration, in response to frustration with the “glacial” progress in In-
dian water rights cases, announced a new policy focused on negotiating tribal water 
rights.244 The administration encouraged tribes to resolve existing water disputes 
through negotiation, and the Warm Springs tribe was an ideal candidate.245 Fifteen 
formal negotiations took place between three parties, most of which centered on 
quantifying the Warm Springs tribe’s reserved water rights.246 The Confederated 
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation Water Rights Settlement Agreement was 
signed in November 1997, establishing the scope and priority of the Warm Springs 
tribe’s reserved water rights.247 
Solidifying the tribe’s reserved water right through a final decree gave the 
tribe firm legal footing for protecting their water rights against environmental ex-
ternalities. The Reagan administration’s shift towards negotiating with the Warm 
Springs tribe is symptomatic of the larger shifts in United States regarding environ-
mental law and the externalities the law sought to combat.248 Nevertheless, these 
good faith negotiations initiated by the government allowed the Warm Springs tribe 
to meaningfully participate in the regulatory system at a point in time when the 
eventual outcome could still be altered and in a manner that held the government 
accountable for both the actions it was taking and the tribal rights it was acknowl-
edging. The ability to impact the underlying regulatory process and to hold govern-
ments accountable for their actions (or lack thereof) has continued to be a core 
element of meaningful participation in the hydropower context.249 
Meanwhile, demands for water in the Upper Klamath Basin had been increas-
ing for nearly a hundred years since the Klamath Project’s authorization in 1905.250 
Competing demands from irrigators, the Klamath River tribes, hydropower projects, 
and the Endangered Species Act came to a head during a drought in the summer of 
2001, one of the driest years on record.251 The Bureau of Reclamation closed the 
Klamath Project’s headgates and halted irrigation deliveries to protect endangered 
fish that were jeopardized by the Klamath Project.252 This marked the first time that 
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the ESA had restricted a large-scale water delivery for a federal project.253 The Kla-
math Basin controversy employed numerous methods in attempting to find a solu-
tion, including litigation and the political process, but a collaborative process and 
negotiation between stakeholders ultimately dictated the most effective result.254 
Using the FERC’s relicensing framework and the Klamath Hydroelectric Project’s 
March 2006 relicensing deadline as an anchor, a group of Klamath Basin stakehold-
ers came together and developed two companion agreements as an alternative to 
the FERC’s relicensing of the dams.255 
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KHBA) and the Klamath Hydroe-
lectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA) provide a comprehensive plan to remove four 
large dams, balance water use in the Basin, and provide more economic stability for 
all of the Klamath’s rural economies.256 The agreements were signed by forty-five 
organizations of federal agencies, tribes, counties, irrigators, conservationists, and 
fishing groups.257 Meaningful public participation mechanisms within the ESA, the 
FPA, and the FERC’s regulatory procedures enabled Klamath Basin stakeholders to 
find a collaborative solution to hydropower externalities in the Basin. Access to high 
quality information regarding the Klamath Hydroelectric Project and the ability to 
challenge FERC’s re-licensure of the dams before an agency decision highlights the 
importance of meaningful participation and effective dispute resolution mecha-
nisms in addressing hydropower externalities. 
Successful negotiations in the Klamath Basin and Columbia River provide a 
stark contrast with the negotiations and public participation mechanisms observed 
with indigenous peoples in Brazil. The Brazilian government’s entrenched support 
of the Belo Monte dam has trivialized the public participation process. One key el-
ement underlying the successful negotiations in the United States in these case 
studies was the government’s commitment to using the public process to inform its 
actions, specifically with a focus on finding a collaborative and synergistic out-
come.258 Public participation is not meaningful when the government is merely 
jumping through regulatory hoops. The organizational commitment to addressing 
hydropower externalities in these case studies was a critical factor in why the public 
participation mechanisms were both meaningful and successful in dictating a re-
sult.259 
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b. Public Participation via Litigation 
Litigation has been a powerful instrument for addressing hydropower exter-
nalities and in expanding the reach and power of modern environmental law. Public 
participation through litigation has been a hallmark dimension of modern environ-
mental law, with most of the major environmental statutes allowing citizen suits to 
challenge agency action.260 This section will discuss hydropower litigation from a 
variety of angles to illustrate how United States law has evolved to more effectively 
address hydropower externalities, while also highlighting areas where the law has 
struggled to meet its intended goals. 
1. The Tellico Dam 
The Endangered Species Act has been a recurrent tool in battling the negative 
externalities surrounding hydropower, though with varying results. Often politi-
cized as a “draconian” statute, the ESA has been versatile in addressing hydropower 
externalities.261 Litigation surrounding Tennessee’s Tellico Dam is an infamous ex-
ample of the ESA’s ability to impede dam construction. In Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill, a dam project was successfully enjoined due to the discovery and subse-
quent the ESA listing of the snail darter, a previously unknown species of perch.262 
Construction on the dam began before the ESA was enacted.263 By the time the 
darter was listed under the ESA, hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent on 
the project and it was near completion.264 Nonetheless, the Secretary of the Interior 
determined that the darter’s “critical habitat” was in a portion of the lower Tennes-
see River, which would be completely inundated by the dam.265 Pursuant to Section 
7 of the ESA, the Secretary ordered all federal agencies to take action as necessary 
“to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize 
the continued existence” of the species,266 effectively enjoining the operation of 
the dam. 
The ESA’s ability to forestall a project that was virtually completed is not to be 
understated. The language of the ESA, and in turn, the intent of Congress, places an 
incalculable value on endangered and threatened species. While Tellico illustrates 
the ESA dictating a positive result, the case simultaneously demonstrates how pub-
lic participation in the regulatory process can only take you so far when powerful 
interests are adamant on a development project. The Tellico Dam was eventually 
completed in 1980 through an unrelated congressional appropriations rider, virtu-
ally nullifying the entire legal saga.267 While the ESA’s teeth make it a valuable tool 
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for combating externalities associated with hydropower projects, Tellico’s end re-
sult exemplifies that even one of the nation’s most comprehensive and far-reaching 
regulatory schemes is unable to fully combat hydropower externalities. Tellico has 
striking parallels to the controversy surrounding Belo Monte. There, a congressional 
appropriations rider pushed through the Tellico Dam despite litigation and public 
outcry, demonstrating that rights given by the legislature can be taken away, sub-
ject to takings limitations. Public participation and litigation are versatile and valu-
able mechanisms for combatting hydropower externalities, but not without limits. 
2. The Columbia River Salmon Saga 
Home to one of the world’s largest hydroelectric systems, the Columbia River 
and its salmon runs have been one of the most prominent restoration efforts in 
United States history and a lightning rod for the ESA litigation.268 Despite a 1980 
Congressional declaration that salmon and hydropower were “co-equals” in the Co-
lumbia Basin system, most of the Columbia’s salmon species have been listed under 
the ESA.269 Charged with implementing the ESA in the Columbia Basin, the NOAA 
has consistently used its administrative discretion to preserve hydropower interests 
in the region, spurring two decades of legal challenges to the NOAA’s ESA imple-
mentation. 270 A number of watershed moments have occurred throughout this 
saga. In 2005, Judge Redden, presiding over the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Oregon, authorized a scathing remand of the NOAA’s 2004 Biological Opinion 
(BiOp) in which the court threatened to step in and “run the river” from the bench 
should the NOAA fail to follow the terms of his order.271 Judge Redden urged coop-
eration between the parties through regular reporting of meetings and progress to 
the court.272 These reports were an innovative mechanism for interjecting more 
meaningful public participation into the legal proceedings, reflecting the court’s 
view that public participation in agency decision-making is critical to striking an eq-
uitable balance of interests.273 The ESA does not provide a right to public comment 
on Section 7 consultation procedures; Judge Redden’s mandate for quarterly re-
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ports from the NOAA was a subtle means of creating a limited forum for public en-
gagement where there would otherwise be none.274 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld Judge Redden’s landmark remand in April 2007, emphasizing agree-
ment that the 2004 BiOp “contained structural flaws that rendered it incompatible 
with the ESA.”275 
Litigation had been ongoing for six years when the National Wildlife Federa-
tion (NWF)—in its seventh amended complaint since 2001—challenged not only the 
current 2014 BiOp, but also argued that the government needed to prepare an EIS 
for each of the 73 actions underlying the BiOp.276 In May 2016, the U.S. District 
Court of Oregon issued an opinion siding with the NWF on almost every argu-
ment.277 The court emphasized the importance of public participation in the con-
text of the NEPA’s EIS, stating, “Congress enacted . . . [NEPA] to ensure a process in 
which all reasonable alternatives are given a ‘hard look’ and all necessary infor-
mation is provided to the public.”278 The battle to protect salmon in the Columbia 
River Basin is ongoing, and meaningful public participation continues to play an in-
tegral role. Transparent and open access to information underlying the govern-
ment’s decision has been crucial in challenging the government’s implementation 
of the NEPA and the ESA. These legal challenges are complex and not always suc-
cessful, but the ability for stakeholders to interact with government action and have 
a meaningful impact on the underlying process and result is crucial.279 The Columbia 
River saga’s long history of litigation and recalcitrant agency action echoes the 
symptoms plaguing Belo Monte, where a comparative lack of legal and regulatory 
accountability has left comprehensive legal challenges to the government’s licens-
ing and development stranded or buried. This further highlights the importance of 
public participation and effective, impartial dispute resolution mechanisms. 
3. FERC, the FPA, and Tribal Rights Litigation 
The Federal Power Act has developed into an effective mechanism for ad-
dressing environmental issues caused by dams through restricting stream flows and 
novel interpretations of the FERC’s licensing powers.280 The FPA has a significant 
impact on many activities and hydropower externalities, such as recreation, water 
quality, and fish and wildlife habitat.281 The relicensing protocols, specifically the 
1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act amendments, demand a reexamination of 
the project based on present day values.282 The ECPA amendments attempted to 
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safeguard fish and wildlife interests in the relicensing process by imposing substan-
tive and procedural requirements on FERC such as notice provisions, public com-
ment periods, and inter-agency consultation.283 Unlike the ESA, the ECPA require-
ments apply regardless of whether a project will jeopardize a listed species or 
not.284 This offers more consistent and far reaching protection than the ESA; not all 
FERC-licensed projects are jeopardizing a listed species, but the ECPA mandates that 
the FERC consider impacts on wildlife and the environment during its relicensing 
process.285 It is important to note that the ECPA does not prevent relicensing.286 
Rather, the ECPA simultaneously acknowledges hydropower’s benefits and its envi-
ronmental externalities, mandating that the FERC weigh them accordingly in its de-
cision-making process.287 Similar to the NEPA, the FERC is not prevented from reli-
censing a dam so long as it jumps through the regulatory hoops, with its determi-
nations subject to challenge in federal court.288 This mitigation and rehabilitation 
strategy seems even more promising given that several hundred dams will require 
relicensing from the FERC in the coming decades.289 
As discussed above, many tribal reserved rights are closely tied to environ-
ments and activities falling within the FERC’s jurisdiction. Accountability and en-
forcement mechanisms built into many of today’s environmental laws have allowed 
“Native American tribes to constrain hydropower development and operation” 
through litigation.290 The FERC’s seemingly autonomous power was dealt a blow in 
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, holding that the 
Secretary of the Interior could impose license conditions on the FERC for projects 
benefitting Indian reservations under the Department of Interior’s (DOI) supervi-
sion.291 In PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, the Su-
preme Court held that section 401 of the Clean Water Act grants states the power 
to impose minimum flows for fish protection and aesthetic enhancement in accord-
ance with state water quality standards.292 Environmental groups now frequently 
use section 401 to alter flow conditions on dams with the FERC licenses, further 
demonstrating the power of meaningful public participation in a transparent and 
accountable regulatory regime.293 
More recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in City of Tacoma v. FERC 
that the FERC’s licensure of any project located partially on an Indian reservation 
must “not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation 
was created or acquired.”294 City of Tacoma also established that the FPA gives the 
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FERC the authority to deny relicensing of a project and order dam decommissioning 
if it has become uneconomic.295 Typically Congress must make major dam removal 
decisions, but this construction of the FPA makes it clear that the FERC has the 
power to decommission certain licensed dams.296 Increasing the FERC’s flexibility 
regarding relicensing has given stakeholders new legal footholds for challenging hy-
dropower externalities through relicensing, a critical time juncture with a unique 
ability to impact agency actions. The NEPA’s required EIS for major federal actions 
combined with the FERC’s mandated feasibility studies has provided a wealth of 
valuable information the public can analyze in examining (and potentially challeng-
ing) the basis for the government’s proposed action. 
Many studies and scholars in the hydropower arena have argued that small-
scale hydropower projects are the future of the resource, in contrast with the typi-
cal federally-funded FERC-licensed projects that have been so controversial in the 
last few decades.297 Public policy debates on the social, environmental, and eco-
nomic benefits of hydropower projects will continue to shape the resource’s fu-
ture.298 Examining the litigation surrounding the FERC, the ESA, and the FPA exem-
plifies how the structure of U.S. regulatory regimes can both help and harm efforts 
to address dam externalities. The ECPA amendments created a unique avenue for 
effecting meaningful change through relicensing, but the structure of the licensing 
regulations allowed the FERC to unilaterally ignore this opportunity until litigation 
forced the agency’s hand. The FERC and the FPA highlight the importance of being 
able to challenge agency action at key points in the regulatory process, allowing 
stakeholders to pressure agencies and bend regulatory regimes towards beneficial 
uses in changing times. 
c. Dam Removal and Decommission 
As discussed above, the 1920 Federal Power Act streamlined hydropower de-
velopment processes and laid the groundwork for the FERC’s historic support of 
large hydropower developments in the United States.299 Responding to significant 
shifts in public perception and changes in hydropower’s economic benefits, Con-
gress adapted the FPA’s regulatory structure to prevent and even rectify environ-
mental degradation.300 This section will examine the Edwards Dam Project, where 
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litigation, negotiation, public participation, and innovative interpretations of regu-
latory frameworks came together to address hydropower externalities through 
dam decommission. 
The Edwards Dam was constructed on Maine’s Kennebec River in 1837.301 
State, federal, and private interests sought removal of the dam to combat 
longstanding negative impacts on fishery resources, along with environmental deg-
radation and impaired recreational activities.302 In a landmark decision, the FERC 
denied the dam’s relicensing request, ruling that the public interest required re-
moval of the Edwards Dam.303 This was the first time the federal government had 
mandated decommission over a dam owner’s objection.304 The FERC relied on the 
EIS prepared in accordance with the NEPA in concluding that the public interest 
would be best served by dam removal, determining that removal was the only op-
tion for mitigating the dam’s adverse environmental impacts.305 The FERC also con-
ducted extensive economic evaluations of the project and its alternatives, finding 
that decommission made the most financial sense given the extensive costs associ-
ated with relicensing.306 
While complex in nature, dam decommissioning procedures requiring involve-
ment of citizens and federal, state, and local governments inherently promote core 
tenants of meaningful participation.307 In the Edwards Project, the EIS conducted 
pursuant to the NEPA and the FERC’s own requirement to issue licenses only for 
plans “best adapted to serve the public interest” provided an abundance of acces-
sible information that stakeholders could utilize in evaluating the government’s de-
cision on the project.308 Stakeholders’ ability to participate in the FERC’s evaluation 
of the Edwards Dam’s relicensing application satisfies the timing component for 
making public participation meaningful. The relicensing stage is an excellent exam-
ple of participating in the regulatory process at a stage with critical bearing on the 
proposed action’s eventual outcome.309 The FERC’s decision with the Edwards Dam 
was successful in addressing hydropower externalities, but accountability measures 
and dispute resolution mechanisms built into the NEPA, the ESA, and the FPA were 
available should the FERC have come to a conclusion at odds with the underlying 
data or statutory requirements. 
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Fundamental drivers behind large dam projects reflect a nation’s prevailing 
attitude regarding the perceived social, environmental, and economic costs and 
benefits of a project, regardless of whether there is actual empirical evidence for or 
against a project.310 Beck, et al. posit that there is an inverse relationship between 
environmental capital and policy effectiveness, “such that as economic develop-
ment increases, environmental capital is diminished whereas policy effectiveness 
becomes maximized.” 311  This analysis highlights a temporal component of eco-
nomic development dictating the governance mechanisms and policies used in mit-
igating the socio-environmental costs of hydropower projects.312 Working under 
this framework, it follows that lack of environmental capital and benefits from re-
source acquisition in U.S. hydropower projects have contributed to the nation’s 
shift toward dam removal and decommission.313 Brazil is less economically devel-
oped than the U.S. and may accordingly derive a higher relative benefit from envi-
ronmental capital, hence the overwhelming political support for Belo Monte. 
Proponents of dam projects often have a substantially disproportionate im-
pact on the decision-making process relative to critics, particularly in developing 
nations where legal and regulatory regimes are not as robust and where there is a 
higher perceived benefit for environmental capital.314 The shift away from dam con-
struction in the United States exemplifies that common benefits favoring hydro-
power projects (electricity generation, flood control, etc.) are no longer sufficient 
to justify the continued existence and associated impacts of such projects.315 As de-
picted with the Edwards Dam removal, meaningful public participation is crucial in 
addressing hydropower externalities at junctures where hydropower projects are 
being considered for construction, relicensing, or removal. Public participation 
mechanisms in the United States have historically struggled to impede dam con-
struction, but the evolution of environmental law and installation of more mean-
ingful participation mechanisms has been integral to addressing hydropower exter-
nalities through dam decommission and deconstruction.316 
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Public participation in the regulatory process and effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms are critical in addressing the socio-environmental externalities stem-
ming from hydropower and ensuring that the law is capable of fulfilling its intended 
goals. This Article analyzed three key mechanisms for making public participation 
more meaningful through case studies and comparisons between the United States 
and Brazil. 
Access to the information underlying the government’s decision-making pro-
cess for a proposed action is crucial for establishing meaningful participation. Indig-
enous peoples impacted by Belo Monte lacked meaningful access to information as 
demonstrated by the government’s failure to translate and distribute Belo Monte’s 
EIA, along with its opacity in addressing socio-environmental concerns brought up 
during the EIA and licensure process. These shortcomings echo those faced by Na-
tive Americans with early hydropower developments in the United States.317 Access 
to information is a necessary element in allowing stakeholders to be informed 
about the nature of the government’s action, which is critical in mounting potential 
legal challenges.318 
To be meaningful, public participation must also be conducted at a time in the 
regulatory process when the underlying action and eventual result can still be influ-
enced.319 Achieving better results is in itself a core component underlying why pub-
lic participation is important to environmental decision-making. While stakeholders 
impacted by Belo Monte have exercised their right to be heard, participation and 
dispute resolution mechanisms have not been able to impact the underlying pro-
cess nor the eventual result. This is in stark contrast to dam decommission and de-
construction in the United States, where stakeholders have been able to intervene 
at crucial junctures in the dam licensure process to drive meaningful results.320 
Lastly, meaningful public participation requires statutory underpinnings that 
facilitate interaction with lawmakers throughout the regulatory process along with 
legal enforcement mechanisms when the process itself is inadequate.321 Accounta-
bility has significant value in the hydropower context, where development projects 
often have far reaching social, economic, and environmental impacts. Adjudicatory 
mechanisms facilitate meaningful participation by allowing both the general public 
and experts to interact with regulators, the development project, and ultimately 
the project’s impacts and externalities. Litigation in the United States has dictated 
a number of results, ranging from the expansion of tribal reserved rights related to 
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hydropower,322 to a court threatening to “run the river” should regulatory decision 
makers fail to uphold their statutory obligations.323 
Open and meaningful participation mechanisms in the environmental decision 
making process help foster an informed citizenry, a transparent and accountable 
government, and an overall higher quality of decision-making related to the envi-
ronment.324 The distinction between public participation that is “meaningful” as op-
posed to public participation that is merely “due” under the law will only become 
more relevant as the social, environmental, and economic externalities imposed by 
hydropower projects become a larger consideration in regulatory law and policy.
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